However, the contract governing the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is set to expire today (December 31) — and Ukraine doesn’t intend to renew it. This means that, as of tomorrow, Europe will no longer be receiving gas through Ukraine. The consequences could be dear. The countries most affected will obviously be the direct recipients of the Ukrainian transit route gas, especially Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Italy.

The stopping of Ukrainian transit will not pose an immediate supply security risk to these countries: though the capacity of alternative pipeline routes —TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary — to replace the Ukrainian transit is limited, storage levels in the EU remain high, and alternative supply sources exist, mainly in the form of shipped LNG.

Prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the EU imported most of its gas via pipelines — mostly from Russia. Since then, in its attempt to decouple from Russian gas, the bloc has massively boosted its LNG imports, which have risen from 20 percent to 50 percent of total gas imports. Almost half of the EU’s LNG imports in 2024 came from the US, though absurdly the EU last year also boosted its imports of Russian LNG — all while reducing its imports of cheaper pipeline gas from the country.

The significantly higher price of LNG — especially that imported from the US — compared to Russian pipeline gas has severely impacted both European households and businesses. Indeed, the recent Draghi report highlighted high energy costs as one of the main reasons for the EU’s loss of competitiveness. The report emphasises that European companies face significantly higher energy costs compared to their US counterparts: energy prices remain “2-3 times higher” for electricity and “4-5 times higher” for natural gas. These high costs have pushed large parts of Western Europe — first and foremost Germany — into recession and even outright deindustrialisation, and continue to seriously hinder industrial growth and investment.

“Barbarism is on the ballot,” columnist George Will declared this week, noting that if the next president doesn’t transform the current policy on Ukraine, which is “so timid, tentative and subject to minute presidential calibrations,” then Russia’s Vladimir Putin’s war could end up being a “great rehearsal” for World War Three.

Meanwhile, the New York Times has said that “two different futures loom” for Ukraine depending on the outcome of Tuesday’s election, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

Much of this is based on the candidates’ rhetoric, and, in the case of Harris, the Biden Administration’s current policy of supporting Ukraine with weapons and aid for “as long as it takes” to defeat Russia. Harris has suggested she would continue this policy, to “stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies,” if elected. She has also accused Donald Trump of being too cozy with Putin and said she would not talk to the Russian president.

For his part, Trump has said he would bring all sides to the table and end the war in a day, and he has been critical of continued U.S aid to Ukraine, which has totaled some $175 billion ($106 billion of which has gone directly to the Ukraine government) since 2022. He has offered no details for how he would end the war or bring the parties together.

But does it matter? In some ways, yes, foreign policy experts tell RS. One side wants to assure that U.S. strategy won’t change, the other advocates for a bold if not abrupt shift that involves a step back from the narrative George Will evinces, that Putin is a barbarian that can only be stopped with more war.

Those same experts say Ukraine is losing, and more weapons and more fighting cannot help. They also point out that official Washington is beginning to realize this too, as is Europe, and a shift toward diplomacy will likely happen no matter who is in the White House come January 2025. (...)