Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

Our colleague @Josephaim18 takes us to Uman, a small town in central Ukraine where Jewish pilgrims continue to make an annual trek to visit a Hasidic saint’s tomb, to mark the Jewish New Year. https://t.co/FmHUglOysa pic.twitter.com/QN9reaCTDy

— Tim Mak (@timkmak) September 20, 2023

This is really over the top and please don't take it seriously but simply enjoy:

https://x.com/runews/status/1704022717505163757?s=20

It has been clear for some time that US corporate news media have explicitly taken a side on the Ukraine War. This role includes suppressing relevant history of the lead-up to the war (FAIR.org, 3/4/22), attacking people who bring up that history as “conspiracy theorists” (FAIR.org, 5/18/22), accepting official government pronouncements at face value (FAIR.org, 12/2/22) and promoting an overly rosy picture of the conflict in order to boost morale.

For most of the war, most of the US coverage has been as pro-Ukrainian as Ukraine’s own media, now consolidated under the Zelenskyy government (FAIR.org, 5/9/23). Dire predictions sporadically appeared, but were drowned out by drumbeat coverage portraying a Ukrainian army on the cusp of victory, and the Russian army as incompetent and on the verge of collapse.

Triumphalist rhetoric soared in early 2023, as optimistic talk of a game-changing “spring offensive” dominated Ukraine coverage. Apparently delayed, the Ukrainian counteroffensive launched in June. While even US officials did not believe that it would amount to much, US media papered over these doubts in the runup to the campaign.

Over the last three months, it has become clear that the Ukrainian military operation will not be the game-changer it was sold as; namely, it will not significantly roll back the Russian occupation and obviate the need for a negotiated settlement. Only after this became undeniable did media report on the true costs of war to the Ukrainian people.

Overwhelming optimism
In the runup to the counteroffensive, US media were full of excited conversation about how it would reshape the nature of the conflict. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told Radio Free Europe (4/21/23) he was “confident Ukraine will be successful.” Sen. Lindsey Graham assured Politico (5/30/23), “In the coming days, you’re going to see a pretty impressive display of power by the Ukrainians.” Asked for his predictions about Ukraine’s plans, retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges told NPR (5/12/23), “I actually expect…they will be quite successful.”

Former CIA Director David Patraeus, author of the overhyped “surge” strategy in Iraq, told CNN (5/23/23):

I personally think that this is going to be really quite successful…. And (the Russians) are going to have to withdraw under pressure of this Ukrainian offensive, the most difficult possible tactical maneuver, and I don’t think they’re going to do well at that.

The Washington Post’s David Ignatius (4/15/23) acknowledged that “hope is not a strategy,” but still insisted that “Ukraine’s will to win—its determination to expel Russian invaders from its territory at whatever cost—might be the X-factor in the decisive season of conflict ahead.”

The New York Times (6/2/23) ran a story praising recruits who signed up for the Ukrainian pushback, even though it “promises to be deadly.” Times columnist Paul Krugman (6/5/23) declared we were witnessing “the moral equivalent of D-Day.” CNN (5/30/23) reported that Ukrainians were “unfazed” as they “gear up for a counteroffensive.”

Cable news was replete with buzz about how the counteroffensive, couched with modifiers like “long-awaited” or “highly anticipated,” could turn the tide in the war. Nightly news shows (e.g., NBC, 6/15/23, 6/16/23) presented audiences with optimistic statements from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other figures talking about the imminent success.

Downplaying reality
Despite the soaring rhetoric presented to audiences, Western officials understood that the counteroffensive was all but doomed to fail. This had been known long before the above comments were reported, but media failed to include that fact as prominently as the predictions for success. (...)

Even taking into account the “record” settlement they made with the
FDIC, the Pritzkers could make more than $700 million in additional
profit for running a financial institution into the ground. They had
already profited handsomely, sharing in the more than $200 million in
dividends to the owners in the ’90s. They accomplished all this with an
investment of about $21 million for each partner—though the Pritzkers
had also already benefited from $645 million in tax credits.

Meanwhile, roughly 1,000 depositors who had deposits above $100,000 in a
Superior account—money above the FDIC-insured limit—lost about $65
million. Most of them were middle-class individuals, attracted by
Superior’s high interest rates. In the three months just before the bank
was closed, there was a surge of $9.6 million in uninsured deposits.
Since about 54 percent of the uninsured money has since been repaid as
Superior was sold off, the depositors have still collectively lost about
$30 million. (That just happens to be the amount that the Pritzkers
gave to the University of Chicago’s Pritzker School of Medicine earlier
this year.)

Some of that money could have paid back Fran Sweet for the roughly $138,000 that she has still not recovered from her deposits at Superior. After retiring as a manager at a telecommunications company, Sweet was seeking a secure place to put her entire retirement savings of about $500,000. “I knew the Pritzkers were owners of the bank,” she says, “and they were a reputable name in Chicago. I had no idea that the bank was in trouble.”

The problems at Superior Bank date back to at least 1988, when the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, in an effort to conceal the depths of the
developing savings-and-loan crisis, hastily made generous arrangements
for the takeover of several failed thrifts. The Pritzkers and Dworman
bought the failed Lyons Federal for the relatively modest price of $42.5
million, with each using a shell corporation to control half of
Coast-to-Coast Financial Corporation (CCFC), a holding company created
to own Superior.

Superior opened for business with substantial federal assistance and
guarantees, but the Pritzkers also reportedly received $645 million in
tax credits as an inducement to buy Lyons. This was not the first
Pritzker-Dworman joint venture into banking. In 1985, the partners had
acquired New York-based River Bank America. But in 1991, federal and
state regulators closed River Bank, which was engaged in large-scale
real estate speculation, when they discovered that the bank had
inadequate capital and was badly managed. Nelson Stephenson, the chief
financial officer of River Bank, later became chairman of Superior.