"Boss politics" are a feature of corrupt societies. When a society is dominated by self-dealing, corrupt institutions, strongman leaders can seize control by appealing to the public's fury and desperation. Then, the boss can selectively punish corrupt entities that oppose him, and since everyone is corrupt, these will be valid prosecutions.

In other words, it's possible to corruptly enforce the law against the guilty. This is just a matter of enforcement priorities: in a legitimate state, enforcers prioritize the wrongdoers who are harming the public the most. Under boss politics, priority is given to the corrupt entities that challenge the boss's power, without regard to whether these lawbreakers are the worst offenders. Meanwhile, worse wrongdoers walk free, provided that they line up behind the boss. (...)

Trump is a classic boss politician – that's what people mean when they call him "transactional": he doesn't act out of principle, he acts out of self interest. The people who give him the most get the most back from him. This means that Biden's brightest legacy – militant antitrust enforcement of a type not seen in generations – is now going to become "boss antitrust," where genuine monopolists are attacked under antitrust law, but only if they oppose Trump: (...)

The Federal Trade Commission has lost its Biden-era chair, the extraordinary Lina Khan, who did more in four years than all her predecessors did in the preceding forty years, combined. The new chair is Republican Andrew Ferguson, whose first day on the job was a bloodbath, in which he killed off multiple, significant actions aimed at producing real, material benefits from Americans who are being absolutely screwed by corporations: (...)

Indictments of arms contractors for corruption and malfeasance are not uncommon, but recently revealed cases of illegal conduct by RTX (formerly Raytheon) are extraordinary even by the relatively lax standards of the defense industry.

The company has agreed to pay nearly $1 billion in fines, which is one of the highest figures ever for corruption in the arms sector. To incur these fines, RTX participated in price gouging on Pentagon contracts, bribing officials in Qatar, and sharing sensitive information with China.

Engaging in illegal conduct on this scale suggests that, far from being an aberration, this behavior may be business as usual for the company. Given the scale of RTX’s malfeasance, the Justice Department should take a close look at the practices of other arms contractors to determine whether these infractions are industry standard.

The company’s approach is reminiscent of the way arms companies did business in the 1960s, when, for example, massive cost overruns on Lockheed Martin’s C-5 transport plane drew fire from internal critics like Ernest Fitzgerald and congressional gadflies, like the-Democratic Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin.

Resorting to bribery has been less prevalent since Sen. Proxmire pushed through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which was a response to a massive scandal involving the bribery of officials in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. The exposure brought about by the scandal – which covered events going back to the 1950s that were not known to the general public until a set of 1975 Senate hearings on the activities of multinational corporations showed the world how bribery was used to sway the decisions of foreign policy makers. This resulted in major consequences, including the conviction of former Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka, along with 10 other business people and government officials.

These days, with the exception of egregious cases like the recent conviction of Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) for taking bribes from the Egyptian government, most arms companies are more subtle in their efforts to influence foreign government officials, as far as can be determined. Bribery as blatant as passing along bags of cash, as happened in a number of cases in the 1960s and 1970s, is no longer prevalent. Now bribes are hidden amongst business deals. For example, a precondition of most major U.S. arms sales is the creation of an “offset” or kickback agreement. Basically, if a country spends billions of dollars on a U.S.-supplied weapon system, the company making the sale is expected to give something back to the purchasing country. (...)